Why Kant Is Not a Moral Intuitionist

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

In this paper, I argue against the view, most eloquently advocated by Dieter Schönecker, that Kant is what I call a “sensualist intuitionist.” Kant’s text does not accommodate a sensualist intuitionist reading; the fact of reason is cognized by reason, not intuition. I agree with Schönecker that the feeling of respect for the moral law makes us feel its obligatory character, but I disagree that this feeling constitutes cognition of the normative content of the moral law. We do not cognize the validity of the moral law through feeling. I argue instead for what I take to be the standard view: We feel through respect for the moral law the limiting and humiliating effect that rational cognition of the moral law has on our sensibility.
Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationRealism and Antirealism in Kant's Moral Philosophy
Subtitle of host publicationNew Essays
EditorsRobinson dos Santos, Elke Elisabeth Schmidt
Publisherde Gruyter
Pages179-196
ISBN (Electronic)9783110574517
ISBN (Print)9783110571226, 9783110685237
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 18 2017

Publication series

NameKantstudien-Ergänzungshefte
Volume199

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Why Kant Is Not a Moral Intuitionist'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this