In this paper, I argue against the view, most eloquently advocated by Dieter Schönecker, that Kant is what I call a “sensualist intuitionist.” Kant’s text does not accommodate a sensualist intuitionist reading; the fact of reason is cognized by reason, not intuition. I agree with Schönecker that the feeling of respect for the moral law makes us feel its obligatory character, but I disagree that this feeling constitutes cognition of the normative content of the moral law. We do not cognize the validity of the moral law through feeling. I argue instead for what I take to be the standard view: We feel through respect for the moral law the limiting and humiliating effect that rational cognition of the moral law has on our sensibility.
|Original language||English (US)|
|Title of host publication||Realism and Antirealism in Kant's Moral Philosophy|
|Subtitle of host publication||New Essays|
|Editors||Robinson dos Santos, Elke Elisabeth Schmidt|
|ISBN (Print)||9783110571226, 9783110685237|
|State||Published - Dec 18 2017|