Who should act as lender of last resort? An incomplete contracts model: A comment

Charles M. Kahn, João A.C. Santos

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Researchers have pointed out that conflicts between the objectives of different bank regulators necessitate careful design of the institutional allocation of regulatory authority. In doing this, however, they often assume that regulators have incentives to share their private information regarding regulated banks. Our paper shows that the very same considerations that lead bank regulators to make different policy choices render the information-sharing assumption invalid. We further show that this result has important implications for the institutional allocation of.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1111-1118
Number of pages8
JournalJournal of Money, Credit and Banking
Volume38
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 1 2006

Keywords

  • Deposit insurance
  • Lending of last resort
  • Supervision

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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