When Not One of the Crowd: The Effects of CEO Ideological Divergence on Lobbying Strategy

Michael Nalick, Scott Kuban, Jason W. Ridge, Asghar Zardkoohi, Leonard Bierman, Mario Schijven

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This paper explores the extent to which CEO ideological divergence influences firm lobbying strategy. Because a CEO’s political ideological disposition is shown to affect firm outcomes, we theorize there are nonmarket strategic implications when the governing party is divergent or convergent from their ideology. Accordingly, we integrate insights from organizational fit literature regarding value congruence and strategic complementarity in order to examine whether CEO political ideological divergence affects lobbying investment and changes the balance between internal and external lobbying activities. Further, we theorize that these outcomes are less pronounced for firms that are highly regulated. Our results support our theorizing, therefore, by identifying how CEO ideology interacts with the opposing political ideology. We unpack the ways in which CEO political ideology influences firm political behavior, thus extending research on CEO political ideology and lobbying.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalJournal of Management
DOIs
StateAccepted/In press - 2022

Keywords

  • CEO decision-making
  • business and government/political economy
  • nonmarket strategies
  • strategic decision-making
  • top management teams/upper echelon

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Strategy and Management

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