Weakening Assumptions for Publicly-Verifiable Deletion

James Bartusek, Dakshita Khurana, Giulio Malavolta, Alexander Poremba, Michael Walter

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

We develop a simple compiler that generically adds publicly-verifiable deletion to a variety of cryptosystems. Our compiler only makes use of one-way functions (or one-way state generators, if we allow the public verification key to be quantum). Previously, similar compilers either relied on indistinguishability obfuscation along with any one-way function (Bartusek et al., ePrint:2023/265), or on almost-regular one-way functions (Bartusek, Khurana and Poremba, CRYPTO 2023).

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationTheory of Cryptography - 21st International Conference, TCC 2023, Proceedings
EditorsGuy Rothblum, Hoeteck Wee
PublisherSpringer
Pages183-197
Number of pages15
ISBN (Print)9783031486234
DOIs
StatePublished - 2023
Event21st International conference on Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2023 - Taipei, Taiwan, Province of China
Duration: Nov 29 2023Dec 2 2023

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume14372 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference21st International conference on Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2023
Country/TerritoryTaiwan, Province of China
CityTaipei
Period11/29/2312/2/23

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • General Computer Science

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