TY - JOUR
T1 - Voter Beliefs and Strategic Voting in Two-Round Elections
AU - Plutowski, Luke
AU - Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca
AU - Winters, Matthew S.
N1 - Funding Information:
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This project was funded in part by a Brown University Research Seed Award. L.P. was supported by the Lemann Institute for Brazilian Studies, the Graduate College, and the Department of Political Science at the University of Illinois while conducting this research. The University of Illinois Office for the Protection of Research Subjects reviewed the human subjects protocol for this research (Protocol Number. 19008).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 University of Utah.
PY - 2021/12
Y1 - 2021/12
N2 - How widespread is strategic voting in two-round electoral systems, and which types of voters are most likely to engage in such behavior? While runoff elections are common in presidential systems around the world, research on strategic voting in these settings remains limited. This paper explores four different types of strategic behavior that are possible in two-round systems, including some types, such as “strong-to-weak” strategic voting, which are not possible in single-shot elections. We use a nationwide survey to assess the incidence and correlates of strategic voting in Brazil’s 2018 presidential election, where thirteen candidates competed in the first round. We find evidence of “weak-to-strong” strategic voting at a similar rate to that documented in single-round elections in other countries. We find little evidence of other types of strategic voting. Furthermore, we show that voters’ confidence in their predictions of the likely electoral outcome and their ideological preferences strongly predict strategic voting. These results point to the importance of accounting for voter beliefs and attitudes in addition to objective voter characteristics to explain strategic voting.
AB - How widespread is strategic voting in two-round electoral systems, and which types of voters are most likely to engage in such behavior? While runoff elections are common in presidential systems around the world, research on strategic voting in these settings remains limited. This paper explores four different types of strategic behavior that are possible in two-round systems, including some types, such as “strong-to-weak” strategic voting, which are not possible in single-shot elections. We use a nationwide survey to assess the incidence and correlates of strategic voting in Brazil’s 2018 presidential election, where thirteen candidates competed in the first round. We find evidence of “weak-to-strong” strategic voting at a similar rate to that documented in single-round elections in other countries. We find little evidence of other types of strategic voting. Furthermore, we show that voters’ confidence in their predictions of the likely electoral outcome and their ideological preferences strongly predict strategic voting. These results point to the importance of accounting for voter beliefs and attitudes in addition to objective voter characteristics to explain strategic voting.
KW - Brazil
KW - strategic voting
KW - two-round presidential elections
KW - voting behavior
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U2 - 10.1177/1065912920940791
DO - 10.1177/1065912920940791
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85088300860
SN - 1065-9129
VL - 74
SP - 852
EP - 865
JO - Political Research Quarterly
JF - Political Research Quarterly
IS - 4
ER -