TY - JOUR
T1 - Visual sensing is seeing
T2 - Why "mindsight," in hindsight, is blind
AU - Simons, Daniel J.
AU - Nevarez, Gabriel
AU - Boot, Walter R.
N1 - Funding Information:
We thank Neal Cohen and Brian Scholl for helpful comments and Michelle Birkett, Diana Kofler, and Cora Wang for assistance with data collection. This research was supported in part by National Science Foundation Grant BCS0241684 to Daniel Simons.
PY - 2005/7
Y1 - 2005/7
N2 - Faced with the surprising failure to notice large changes to visual scenes (change blindness), many researchers have sought evidence for alternative, nonattentional routes to change detection. A recent article in Psychological Science (Rensink, 2004) proposed a new, nonsensory "mindsight" mechanism to explain the finding that some subjects on some trials reported sensing the presence of a recurring change before they could explicitly identify it and without having a localizable visual experience of change. This mechanism would constitute a previously unknown mode of seeing that, as Rensink suggested, might be akin to a sixth sense. Its existence would have radical implications for the mechanisms underlying conscious visual experience. Provocative claims merit rigorous scrutiny. We rebut the existence of a mindsight mechanism by supporting a more mundane explanation: Some subjects take time to verify their initial conscious detection of changes.
AB - Faced with the surprising failure to notice large changes to visual scenes (change blindness), many researchers have sought evidence for alternative, nonattentional routes to change detection. A recent article in Psychological Science (Rensink, 2004) proposed a new, nonsensory "mindsight" mechanism to explain the finding that some subjects on some trials reported sensing the presence of a recurring change before they could explicitly identify it and without having a localizable visual experience of change. This mechanism would constitute a previously unknown mode of seeing that, as Rensink suggested, might be akin to a sixth sense. Its existence would have radical implications for the mechanisms underlying conscious visual experience. Provocative claims merit rigorous scrutiny. We rebut the existence of a mindsight mechanism by supporting a more mundane explanation: Some subjects take time to verify their initial conscious detection of changes.
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U2 - 10.1111/j.0956-7976.2005.01568.x
DO - 10.1111/j.0956-7976.2005.01568.x
M3 - Review article
C2 - 16008783
AN - SCOPUS:23944433897
SN - 0956-7976
VL - 16
SP - 520
EP - 524
JO - Psychological Science
JF - Psychological Science
IS - 7
ER -