This article analyzes the use of vetoes in multiparty presidential systems. It suggests that the nature of executive-legislative bargaining is fundamentally altered when multiple parties compose the legislature and when presidential veto prerogatives are extended to incorporate partial (line-item) vetoes. Using a data set that includes all bills passed by the Argentine Congress in the past 25 years, we estimate veto occurrence under different scenarios. Our findings are at odds with received expectations: whether the President holds a majority in Congress or not fails to explain variations in the likelihood of vetoes. Instead, the level of significance of legislation is relevant for predicting vetoes, with landmark legislation being more likely to be vetoed regardless of levels of support for the president in Congress. In addition, partial vetoes become the preferred alternative when confronting legislation initiated by the president herself.
- Latin America
- presidential veto
- separation of powers systems
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Sociology and Political Science