VCG-Kelly mechanisms for allocation of divisible goods: Adapting VCG mechanisms to one-dimensional signals

Sichao Yang; Bruce Hajek

doi:10.1109/JSAC.2007.070817

VCG-Kelly mechanisms for allocation of divisible goods: Adapting VCG mechanisms to one-dimensional signals

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

The VCG-Kelly mechanism is proposed, which is obtained by composing the communication efficient, one-dimensional signaling idea of Kelly with the VCG mechanism, providing efficient allocation for strategic buyers at Nash equilibrium points. It is shown that the revenue to the seller can be maximized or minimized using a particular one-dimensional family of surrogate valuation functions.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	1237-1243
Number of pages	7
Journal	IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Volume	25
Issue number	6
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/JSAC.2007.070817
State	Published - Aug 2007

Keywords

Divisible goods
Mechanism design
VCG mechanism
VCK-Kelly mechanism

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Computer Networks and Communications
Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Online availability

10.1109/JSAC.2007.070817

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abstract = "The VCG-Kelly mechanism is proposed, which is obtained by composing the communication efficient, one-dimensional signaling idea of Kelly with the VCG mechanism, providing efficient allocation for strategic buyers at Nash equilibrium points. It is shown that the revenue to the seller can be maximized or minimized using a particular one-dimensional family of surrogate valuation functions.",

keywords = "Divisible goods, Mechanism design, VCG mechanism, VCK-Kelly mechanism",

author = "Sichao Yang and Bruce Hajek",

note = "Funding Information: The authors wish to thank Prof. Steven R. Williams and the reviewers for their useful comments. This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under grants NSF CNS 05-19691 and NSF ECS 06-21416. REFERENCES",

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VCG-Kelly mechanisms for allocation of divisible goods: Adapting VCG mechanisms to one-dimensional signals

Abstract

Keywords

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