VCG-Kelly mechanisms for allocation of divisible goods: Adapting VCG mechanisms to one-dimensional signals

Sichao Yang, Bruce Hajek

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

The VCG-Kelly mechanism is proposed, which is obtained by composing the communication efficient, one-dimensional signaling idea of Kelly with the VCG mechanism, providing efficient allocation for strategic buyers at Nash equilibrium points. It is shown that the revenue to the seller can be maximized or minimized using a particular one-dimensional family of surrogate valuation functions.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1237-1243
Number of pages7
JournalIEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Volume25
Issue number6
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 2007

Keywords

  • Divisible goods
  • Mechanism design
  • VCG mechanism
  • VCK-Kelly mechanism

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'VCG-Kelly mechanisms for allocation of divisible goods: Adapting VCG mechanisms to one-dimensional signals'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this