Using field experiments to understand information as an antidote to corruption

Matthew S. Winters, Paul Testa, Mark M. Fredrickson

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter


In observational data, access to information is associated with lower levels of corruption. This chapter reviews a small but growing body of work that uses field experiments to explore the mechanisms behind this relationship. We present a typology for understanding this research based on the type of corruption being addressed (political vs. bureaucratic), the mechanism for accountability (retrospective vs. prospective), and the nature of the information provided (factual vs. prescriptive). We describe some of the tradeoffs involved in design decisions for such experiments and suggest directions for future research.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationNew Advances in Experimental Research on Corruption
EditorsDanila Serra, Leonard Wantchekon
PublisherEmerald Group Publishing Ltd.
Number of pages34
ISBN (Print)9781780527840
StatePublished - 2012
Externally publishedYes

Publication series

NameResearch in Experimental Economics
ISSN (Print)0193-2306

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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