TY - UNPB
T1 - Trick or Treat? The Effects of Online App Platforms’ Tiered Commission Schemes on Innovation, Entry, and Profits
AU - Fazli, Amir
AU - Bao, Ying
AU - Kim, Antino
PY - 2024/5/8
Y1 - 2024/5/8
N2 - Online app platforms often charge developer firms commissions
based on revenue tiers, moving beyond the traditional flat-rate schemes.
Platforms like Steam have implemented an "upward" scheme, lowering
rates for higher-earning firms to reward high performers and encourage
innovation, while others like Apple have adopted a "downward" scheme,
charging lower rates to lower-earning firms to support small businesses.
These contrasting approaches raise key questions: How should a platform
design its commission scheme? How does it impact the platform’s profits
compared to the flat-rate scheme, and what are the implications for
market entry, innovation, and profitability among firms with different
levels of capabilities? Using a game-theoretic model involving a
platform and two firms with differing innovation capabilities (i.e.,
high- and low-types), we find that the downward scheme is optimal only
under specific conditions: When the entry cost is moderately high
(requiring additional support for the low-type firm) and the innovation
capability gap between firms is relatively narrow (making it feasible to
provide the support). In most other cases, the upward scheme is more
beneficial for the platform. While the tiered scheme may seem to
encourage entry by offering lower commission rates, we find tiered
schemes may actually discourage the entry of the low-type firm.
Additionally, the upward scheme's effect on firms' incentives to
innovate may vary, potentially leading to a decline in quality.
Interestingly, even with a better commission rate and increased effort
in innovation, firms’ profits may suffer under tiered schemes. By
contrast, tiered schemes offer the platform additional strategic levers
compared to the flat-rate scheme, enabling it to extract more surplus
from firms, which consistently leaves the platform better off with
tiered schemes. We explain the mechanisms behind these findings,
offering both theoretical insights and practical implications. Our
in-depth analysis of different tiered schemes uncovers the dynamics at
play, offering a new perspective to evaluate industry claims and market
forecasts.
AB - Online app platforms often charge developer firms commissions
based on revenue tiers, moving beyond the traditional flat-rate schemes.
Platforms like Steam have implemented an "upward" scheme, lowering
rates for higher-earning firms to reward high performers and encourage
innovation, while others like Apple have adopted a "downward" scheme,
charging lower rates to lower-earning firms to support small businesses.
These contrasting approaches raise key questions: How should a platform
design its commission scheme? How does it impact the platform’s profits
compared to the flat-rate scheme, and what are the implications for
market entry, innovation, and profitability among firms with different
levels of capabilities? Using a game-theoretic model involving a
platform and two firms with differing innovation capabilities (i.e.,
high- and low-types), we find that the downward scheme is optimal only
under specific conditions: When the entry cost is moderately high
(requiring additional support for the low-type firm) and the innovation
capability gap between firms is relatively narrow (making it feasible to
provide the support). In most other cases, the upward scheme is more
beneficial for the platform. While the tiered scheme may seem to
encourage entry by offering lower commission rates, we find tiered
schemes may actually discourage the entry of the low-type firm.
Additionally, the upward scheme's effect on firms' incentives to
innovate may vary, potentially leading to a decline in quality.
Interestingly, even with a better commission rate and increased effort
in innovation, firms’ profits may suffer under tiered schemes. By
contrast, tiered schemes offer the platform additional strategic levers
compared to the flat-rate scheme, enabling it to extract more surplus
from firms, which consistently leaves the platform better off with
tiered schemes. We explain the mechanisms behind these findings,
offering both theoretical insights and practical implications. Our
in-depth analysis of different tiered schemes uncovers the dynamics at
play, offering a new perspective to evaluate industry claims and market
forecasts.
KW - Commission scheme
KW - agency selling
KW - online marketplace
KW - platforms
U2 - 10.2139/ssrn.4820568
DO - 10.2139/ssrn.4820568
M3 - Working paper
BT - Trick or Treat? The Effects of Online App Platforms’ Tiered Commission Schemes on Innovation, Entry, and Profits
ER -