Towards continuous access control validation and forensics

Chengcheng Xiang, Yudong Wu, Bingyu Shen, Mingyao Shen, Haochen Huang, Tianyin Xu, Yuanyuan Zhou, Cindy Moore, Xinxin Jin, Tianwei Sheng

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Access control is often reported to be “profoundly broken” in real-world practices due to prevalent policy misconfigurations introduced by system administrators (sysadmins). Given the dynamics of resource and data sharing, access control policies need to be continuously updated. Unfortunately, to err is human-sysadmins often make mistakes such as over-granting privileges when changing access control policies. With today's limited tooling support for continuous validation, such mistakes can stay unnoticed for a long time until eventually being exploited by attackers, causing catastrophic security incidents. We present P-DIFF, a practical tool for monitoring access control behavior to help sysadmins early detect unintended access control policy changes and perform postmortem forensic analysis upon security attacks. P-DIFF continuously monitors access logs and infers access control policies from them. To handle the challenge of policy evolution, we devise a novel time-changing decision tree to effectively represent access control policy changes, coupled with a new learning algorithm to infer the tree from access logs. P-DIFF provides sysadmins with the inferred policies and detected changes to assist the following two tasks: (1) validating whether the access control changes are intended or not; (2) pinpointing the historical changes responsible for a given security attack. We evaluate P-DIFF with a variety of datasets collected from five real-world systems, including two from industrial companies. P-DIFF can detect 86%-100% of access control policy changes with an average precision of 89%. For forensic analysis, P-DIFF can pinpoint the root-cause change that permits the target access in 85%-98% of the evaluated cases.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationCCS 2019 - Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery
Pages113-129
Number of pages17
ISBN (Electronic)9781450367479
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 6 2019
Event26th ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2019 - London, United Kingdom
Duration: Nov 11 2019Nov 15 2019

Publication series

NameProceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
ISSN (Print)1543-7221

Conference

Conference26th ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2019
Country/TerritoryUnited Kingdom
CityLondon
Period11/11/1911/15/19

Keywords

  • Access control
  • Access logs
  • Decision tree
  • Forensics
  • Misconfiguration
  • Policy change

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Computer Networks and Communications

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