TY - JOUR
T1 - To give or not to give
T2 - 25th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2016
AU - Brânzei, Simina
AU - Lv, Yuezhou
AU - Mehta, Ruta
N1 - Funding Information:
We are grateful to Erel Segal-Halevi for useful feedback. The authors aknowledge support from the Danish National Research Foundation and The National Science Foundation of China (under the grant 61361136003) for the Sino-Danish Center for the Theory of Interactive Computation and from the Center for Research in Foundations of Electronic Markets (CFEM), supported by the Danish Strategic Research Council. A part of this work was done while Simina Branzei and Ruta Mehta were visiting the Simons Institute for the Theory of Computing. Simina Branzei was also supported by ISF grant 1435/14 administered by the Israeli Academy of Sciences and Israel-USA Bi-national Science Foundation (BSF) grant 2014389, as well as the I-CORE Program of the Planning and Budgeting Committee and The Israel Science Foundation
Copyright:
Copyright 2017 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2016
Y1 - 2016
N2 - Single minded agents have strict preferences, in which a bundle is acceptable only if it meets a certain demand. Such preferences arise naturally in scenarios such as allocating computational resources among users, where the goal is to fairly serve as many requests as possible. In this paper we study the fair division problem for such agents, which is complex due to discontinuity and complementarities of preferences. Our solution concept-the competitive allocation from equal incomes (CAEI)-is inspired from market equilibria and implements fair outcomes through a pricing mechanism. We study existence and computation of CAEI for multiple divisible goods, discrete goods, and cake cutting. Our solution is useful more generally, when the players have a target set of goods, and very small positive values for any bundle other than their target set.
AB - Single minded agents have strict preferences, in which a bundle is acceptable only if it meets a certain demand. Such preferences arise naturally in scenarios such as allocating computational resources among users, where the goal is to fairly serve as many requests as possible. In this paper we study the fair division problem for such agents, which is complex due to discontinuity and complementarities of preferences. Our solution concept-the competitive allocation from equal incomes (CAEI)-is inspired from market equilibria and implements fair outcomes through a pricing mechanism. We study existence and computation of CAEI for multiple divisible goods, discrete goods, and cake cutting. Our solution is useful more generally, when the players have a target set of goods, and very small positive values for any bundle other than their target set.
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M3 - Conference article
AN - SCOPUS:85006166558
SN - 1045-0823
VL - 2016-January
SP - 123
EP - 129
JO - IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
JF - IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Y2 - 9 July 2016 through 15 July 2016
ER -