TY - JOUR
T1 - Time consistency in alternating-move policy games
AU - Cho, I. Koo
AU - Matsui, Akihiko
PY - 2005/9
Y1 - 2005/9
N2 - We examine alternating-move policy games where the government and the private sector alternate their moves. In contrast with the standard policy game, the set of equilibrium payoffs of the present model is bounded away from the payoff under the one-shot Nash equilibrium, called the Kydland-Prescott outcome, and the upper bound is close to the payoff under the optimal policy (called the Ramsey policy) if the government is sufficiently patient. In other words, the Kydland-Prescott outcome is not time consistent, while the Ramsey outcome could be approximated by a time-consistent policy of the same game.
AB - We examine alternating-move policy games where the government and the private sector alternate their moves. In contrast with the standard policy game, the set of equilibrium payoffs of the present model is bounded away from the payoff under the one-shot Nash equilibrium, called the Kydland-Prescott outcome, and the upper bound is close to the payoff under the optimal policy (called the Ramsey policy) if the government is sufficiently patient. In other words, the Kydland-Prescott outcome is not time consistent, while the Ramsey outcome could be approximated by a time-consistent policy of the same game.
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U2 - 10.1111/j.1468-5876.2005.00326.x
DO - 10.1111/j.1468-5876.2005.00326.x
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:29044443115
SN - 1352-4739
VL - 56
SP - 273
EP - 294
JO - Japanese Economic Review
JF - Japanese Economic Review
IS - 3
ER -