Threshold policy for global games with noisy information sharing

Hessam Mahdavifar, Ahmad Beirami, Behrouz Touri, Jeff S. Shamma

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

It is known that global games with noisy sharing of information do not admit a certain type of threshold policies [1]. Motivated by this result, we investigate the existence of threshold-type policies on global games with noisy sharing of information and show that such equilibrium strategies exist and are unique if the sharing of information happens over a sufficiently noisy environment. To show this result, we establish that if a threshold function is an equilibrium strategy, then it will be a solution to a fixed point equation. Then, we show that for a sufficiently noisy environment, the functional fixed point equation leads to a contraction mapping, and hence, its iterations converge to a unique continuous threshold policy.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication54rd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control,CDC 2015
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages5865-5870
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9781479978861
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 8 2015
Externally publishedYes
Event54th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2015 - Osaka, Japan
Duration: Dec 15 2015Dec 18 2015

Publication series

NameProceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
Volume54rd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control,CDC 2015
ISSN (Print)0743-1546

Other

Other54th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2015
CountryJapan
CityOsaka
Period12/15/1512/18/15

Keywords

  • Computers
  • Electronic mail
  • Games
  • Information management
  • Mathematical model
  • Noise measurement
  • Random variables

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Modeling and Simulation
  • Control and Optimization

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