Third-Party Actors and the Intentional Targeting of Civilians in War

Benjamin J. Appel, Alyssa K. Prorok

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This article examines the relationship between third-party actors and the intentional targeting of non-combatants in interstate war. It argues that war participants kill fewer civilians in war when their expectation of third-party punishment is high. Combatants will anticipate a high likelihood of third-party sanctions when their alliance and trade networks are dominated by third parties that have ratified international treaties prohibiting the intentional targeting of non-combatants. The study hypothesizes that war combatants kill fewer civilians in war as the strength of ratifiers within their alliance and trade networks increases. Quantitative tests on a dataset of all interstate wars from 1900-2003 provide strong statistical and substantive support for this hypothesis.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1453-1474
Number of pages22
JournalBritish Journal of Political Science
Volume49
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 1 2019
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

international agreement
sanction
penalty

Keywords

  • civilian targeting
  • international humanitarian law
  • interstate war

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science

Cite this

Third-Party Actors and the Intentional Targeting of Civilians in War. / Appel, Benjamin J.; Prorok, Alyssa K.

In: British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 49, No. 4, 01.10.2019, p. 1453-1474.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{24e85a695a1740b6901ae54a750d8a39,
title = "Third-Party Actors and the Intentional Targeting of Civilians in War",
abstract = "This article examines the relationship between third-party actors and the intentional targeting of non-combatants in interstate war. It argues that war participants kill fewer civilians in war when their expectation of third-party punishment is high. Combatants will anticipate a high likelihood of third-party sanctions when their alliance and trade networks are dominated by third parties that have ratified international treaties prohibiting the intentional targeting of non-combatants. The study hypothesizes that war combatants kill fewer civilians in war as the strength of ratifiers within their alliance and trade networks increases. Quantitative tests on a dataset of all interstate wars from 1900-2003 provide strong statistical and substantive support for this hypothesis.",
keywords = "civilian targeting, international humanitarian law, interstate war",
author = "Appel, {Benjamin J.} and Prorok, {Alyssa K.}",
year = "2019",
month = "10",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1017/S0007123417000175",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "49",
pages = "1453--1474",
journal = "British Journal of Political Science",
issn = "0007-1234",
publisher = "Cambridge University Press",
number = "4",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Third-Party Actors and the Intentional Targeting of Civilians in War

AU - Appel, Benjamin J.

AU - Prorok, Alyssa K.

PY - 2019/10/1

Y1 - 2019/10/1

N2 - This article examines the relationship between third-party actors and the intentional targeting of non-combatants in interstate war. It argues that war participants kill fewer civilians in war when their expectation of third-party punishment is high. Combatants will anticipate a high likelihood of third-party sanctions when their alliance and trade networks are dominated by third parties that have ratified international treaties prohibiting the intentional targeting of non-combatants. The study hypothesizes that war combatants kill fewer civilians in war as the strength of ratifiers within their alliance and trade networks increases. Quantitative tests on a dataset of all interstate wars from 1900-2003 provide strong statistical and substantive support for this hypothesis.

AB - This article examines the relationship between third-party actors and the intentional targeting of non-combatants in interstate war. It argues that war participants kill fewer civilians in war when their expectation of third-party punishment is high. Combatants will anticipate a high likelihood of third-party sanctions when their alliance and trade networks are dominated by third parties that have ratified international treaties prohibiting the intentional targeting of non-combatants. The study hypothesizes that war combatants kill fewer civilians in war as the strength of ratifiers within their alliance and trade networks increases. Quantitative tests on a dataset of all interstate wars from 1900-2003 provide strong statistical and substantive support for this hypothesis.

KW - civilian targeting

KW - international humanitarian law

KW - interstate war

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85041338075&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85041338075&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1017/S0007123417000175

DO - 10.1017/S0007123417000175

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85041338075

VL - 49

SP - 1453

EP - 1474

JO - British Journal of Political Science

JF - British Journal of Political Science

SN - 0007-1234

IS - 4

ER -