Theories of bias in probability judgment

Michael H. Birnbaum, Carolyn J. Anderson, Linda G. Hynan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


When psychologists study human judgments of probability, judged probabilities unfortunately do not conform to the equations of probability theory. Because probability theory offers such a convenient and compelling structure for discussing beliefs about ambiguous and uncertain events, many scholars have found it disturbing to think that humans might have been rational enough to invent probability theory but not rational enough to use it in their daily thought. This chapter will explore explanations of the discrepancies between judged probabilities and the implications of probability theory.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)477-498
Number of pages22
JournalAdvances in Psychology
Issue numberC
StatePublished - Jan 1990

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Psychology

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