The value of genetic information in the life insurance market

Michael Hoy, Mattias Polborn

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


This paper analyzes the effects of additional information in a life insurance market under adverse selection. Individuals have an incentive to acquire information about their risk type if their informational status cannot be observed by insurers. In aggregate, however, the existence of a testing opportunity has an effect on the equilibrium premium. We describe the conditions under which, from an ex ante standpoint, all individuals gain, all lose or in which some gain and some lose from the existence of the test.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)235-252
Number of pages18
JournalJournal of Public Economics
Issue number3
StatePublished - Nov 2000
Externally publishedYes


  • D61
  • D82

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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