TY - JOUR
T1 - The value of genetic information in the life insurance market
AU - Hoy, Michael
AU - Polborn, Mattias
N1 - Funding Information:
This paper was begun while the first author visited the Center for Economic Studies, University of Munich. Their hospitality and financial support are very much appreciated. Financial support from DAAD for Polborn is gratefully acknowledged. We also received financial support for this project from the Canadian Genome Analysis and Technology programme (# G0-12776).Very useful comments from two referees are highly appreciated.
PY - 2000/11
Y1 - 2000/11
N2 - This paper analyzes the effects of additional information in a life insurance market under adverse selection. Individuals have an incentive to acquire information about their risk type if their informational status cannot be observed by insurers. In aggregate, however, the existence of a testing opportunity has an effect on the equilibrium premium. We describe the conditions under which, from an ex ante standpoint, all individuals gain, all lose or in which some gain and some lose from the existence of the test.
AB - This paper analyzes the effects of additional information in a life insurance market under adverse selection. Individuals have an incentive to acquire information about their risk type if their informational status cannot be observed by insurers. In aggregate, however, the existence of a testing opportunity has an effect on the equilibrium premium. We describe the conditions under which, from an ex ante standpoint, all individuals gain, all lose or in which some gain and some lose from the existence of the test.
KW - D61
KW - D82
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U2 - 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00118-8
DO - 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00118-8
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0034311638
SN - 0047-2727
VL - 78
SP - 235
EP - 252
JO - Journal of Public Economics
JF - Journal of Public Economics
IS - 3
ER -