TY - JOUR
T1 - The unexpected empirical consensus among consensus methods
AU - Regenwetter, Michel
AU - Kim, Aeri
AU - Kantor, Arthur
AU - Ho, Moon Ho R.
N1 - Funding Information:
This research was supported by the University of Illinois Research Board. We thank the American Psychological Association for access to their ballots. We thank S. Brams, D. Budescu, J. Dana, J.-C. Falmagne, D. Felsenthal, B. Grofman, Y.-F. Hsu, P. Laughlin, R.D. Luce, M. Machover, A.A.J. Marley, A. Rapoport, D. Saari, I. Tsetlin, A. Urken, two referees, and the action editor for their comments.
PY - 2007/7
Y1 - 2007/7
N2 - In economics and political science, the theoretical literature on social choice routinely highlights worst-case scenarios and emphasizes the nonexistence of a universally best voting method. Behavioral social choice is grounded in psychology and tackles consensus methods descriptively and empirically. We analyzed four elections of the American Psychological Association using a state-of-the-art multimodel, multimethod approach. These elections provide rare access to (likely sincere) preferences of large numbers of decision makers over five choice alternatives. We determined the outcomes according to three classical social choice procedures: Condorcet, Borda, and plurality. Although the literature routinely depicts these procedures as irreconcilable, we found strong statistical support for an unexpected degree of empirical consensus among them in these elections. Our empirical findings stand in contrast to two centuries of pessimistic thought experiments and computer simulations in social choice theory and demonstrate the need for more systematic descriptive and empirical research on social choice than exists to date.
AB - In economics and political science, the theoretical literature on social choice routinely highlights worst-case scenarios and emphasizes the nonexistence of a universally best voting method. Behavioral social choice is grounded in psychology and tackles consensus methods descriptively and empirically. We analyzed four elections of the American Psychological Association using a state-of-the-art multimodel, multimethod approach. These elections provide rare access to (likely sincere) preferences of large numbers of decision makers over five choice alternatives. We determined the outcomes according to three classical social choice procedures: Condorcet, Borda, and plurality. Although the literature routinely depicts these procedures as irreconcilable, we found strong statistical support for an unexpected degree of empirical consensus among them in these elections. Our empirical findings stand in contrast to two centuries of pessimistic thought experiments and computer simulations in social choice theory and demonstrate the need for more systematic descriptive and empirical research on social choice than exists to date.
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U2 - 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01950.x
DO - 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01950.x
M3 - Article
C2 - 17614872
AN - SCOPUS:34547341248
SN - 0956-7976
VL - 18
SP - 629
EP - 635
JO - Psychological Science
JF - Psychological Science
IS - 7
ER -