The social creation of action and inaction

From concepts to goals to behaviors

Dolores Albarracin, Aashna Sunderrajan, Wenhao Dai, Benjamin X. White

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

This chapter presents a model of the cognitive, motivational, and behavioral implications of the concepts of action and inaction. The action or inaction nature of a behavior is a judgment, a subjective and variable construal, made by the actor or an observer based on concepts of action and inaction. In other literatures, action and inaction concepts entail affirming or negating of any behavior, but we posit that they are best defined in terms of level of effort and intentionality. People define action as more intentional and effortful than inaction and consequently establish default evaluations of action as more positive than inaction. In this chapter, we discuss how action and inaction are set as goals, how these goals differ from active and inactive means, and how these goals are implemented and considered complete. The chapter integrates disparate work on general action biases, action and inaction goals, and process models of goals. We describe specific principles that guide goal systems containing action and inaction goals, and the principles summarizing action-goal dominance at the stages of goal setting, implementation, and monitoring/completion.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationAdvances in Experimental Social Psychology
PublisherAcademic Press Inc.
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2019

Publication series

NameAdvances in Experimental Social Psychology
ISSN (Print)0065-2601

Keywords

  • Action
  • Attitude
  • Behavior change
  • Evaluation
  • Goal
  • Inaction
  • Judgment

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Psychology

Cite this

Albarracin, D., Sunderrajan, A., Dai, W., & White, B. X. (2019). The social creation of action and inaction: From concepts to goals to behaviors. In Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Advances in Experimental Social Psychology). Academic Press Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.aesp.2019.04.001

The social creation of action and inaction : From concepts to goals to behaviors. / Albarracin, Dolores; Sunderrajan, Aashna; Dai, Wenhao; White, Benjamin X.

Advances in Experimental Social Psychology. Academic Press Inc., 2019. (Advances in Experimental Social Psychology).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Albarracin, D, Sunderrajan, A, Dai, W & White, BX 2019, The social creation of action and inaction: From concepts to goals to behaviors. in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Academic Press Inc. https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.aesp.2019.04.001
Albarracin D, Sunderrajan A, Dai W, White BX. The social creation of action and inaction: From concepts to goals to behaviors. In Advances in Experimental Social Psychology. Academic Press Inc. 2019. (Advances in Experimental Social Psychology). https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.aesp.2019.04.001
Albarracin, Dolores ; Sunderrajan, Aashna ; Dai, Wenhao ; White, Benjamin X. / The social creation of action and inaction : From concepts to goals to behaviors. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology. Academic Press Inc., 2019. (Advances in Experimental Social Psychology).
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