Abstract
We study the role of a market maker (or market operator) in a transmission constrained electricity market. We model the market as a one-shot networked Cournot competition where generators supply quantity bids and load serving entities provide downward sloping inverse demand functions. This mimics the operation of a spot market in a deregulated market structure. In this paper, we focus on possible mechanisms employed by the market maker to balance demand and supply. In particular, we consider three candidate objective functions that the market maker optimizes - social welfare, residual social welfare, and consumer surplus. We characterize the existence of Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE) in this setting and demonstrate that market outcomes at equilibrium can be very different under the candidate objective functions.
Original language | English (US) |
---|---|
Article number | 7040088 |
Pages (from-to) | 4479-4484 |
Number of pages | 6 |
Journal | Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control |
Volume | 2015-February |
Issue number | February |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2014 |
Externally published | Yes |
Event | 2014 53rd IEEE Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2014 - Los Angeles, United States Duration: Dec 15 2014 → Dec 17 2014 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Control and Systems Engineering
- Modeling and Simulation
- Control and Optimization