TY - JOUR
T1 - The Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion
T2 - Chinese Dual-Pension Regimes in the Era of Labor Migration and Labor Informalization
AU - Yang, Yujeong
N1 - Funding Information:
The author disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the Kenneth G. Lieberthal and Richard H. Rogel Center for Chinese Studies at the University of Michigan and the Rackham International Research Grant.
Funding Information:
I would like to thank the editorial board of Politics & Society for their very helpful comments on the earlier version of the article. I am also especially grateful for insightful comments from Mary Gallagher, Eli Friedman, Dorothy Solinger, and participants at the 2017 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association and the China Reading Group at the University of Michigan. The author disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the Kenneth G. Lieberthal and Richard H. Rogel Center for Chinese Studies at the University of Michigan and the Rackham International Research Grant.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 SAGE Publications.
PY - 2021/6
Y1 - 2021/6
N2 - Why do some Chinese local governments include informal workers in their welfare systems while others exclude them? This article argues that local officials attempt to balance multiple, conflicting, top-down career-evaluation criteria by developing different inclusion mechanisms. The central mandate to build an inclusive welfare regime incentivizes local officials to embrace welfare “outsiders” (informal workers and nonlocal workers). However, other top-down policy goals and the locally defined citizenship (hukou) system disincentivize the full integration of outsiders. Faced with this political dilemma, local officials have strategically incorporated different types of outsiders into their welfare regimes. Their strategies depend on local labor market structures—specifically, the extent to which informal workers overlap with nonlocal workers. This hypothesis is tested using an original data set derived from thirty-one Chinese provinces, covering the period between 2005 and 2015, as well as two rounds of national-level survey data. Findings suggest that recent Chinese welfare expansion has ironically consolidated, even exacerbated, regional inequality.
AB - Why do some Chinese local governments include informal workers in their welfare systems while others exclude them? This article argues that local officials attempt to balance multiple, conflicting, top-down career-evaluation criteria by developing different inclusion mechanisms. The central mandate to build an inclusive welfare regime incentivizes local officials to embrace welfare “outsiders” (informal workers and nonlocal workers). However, other top-down policy goals and the locally defined citizenship (hukou) system disincentivize the full integration of outsiders. Faced with this political dilemma, local officials have strategically incorporated different types of outsiders into their welfare regimes. Their strategies depend on local labor market structures—specifically, the extent to which informal workers overlap with nonlocal workers. This hypothesis is tested using an original data set derived from thirty-one Chinese provinces, covering the period between 2005 and 2015, as well as two rounds of national-level survey data. Findings suggest that recent Chinese welfare expansion has ironically consolidated, even exacerbated, regional inequality.
KW - China
KW - labor informalization
KW - labor migration
KW - nonlocal workers
KW - pension
KW - welfare
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U2 - 10.1177/0032329220924557
DO - 10.1177/0032329220924557
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85085585243
SN - 0032-3292
VL - 49
SP - 147
EP - 180
JO - Politics and Society
JF - Politics and Society
IS - 2
ER -