THE NEW SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION: THE MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER IQBALAND TWOMBLY.

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Abstract

This Symposium Article argues that the motion to dismiss is the new summary judgment motion. In Iqbal v. Ashcroft and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Supreme Court created a new standard for granting motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Under the standard, a court decides whether a claim is plausible. This new plausibility standard is converging with the standard for summary judgment under Rule 56. Not coincidentally, the motion to dismiss appears to be having some of the same effects as summary judgment, including on the dismissal of employment discrimination claims. Moreover, as a result of the similarities between the motion to dismiss and the summary judgment standards, the Supreme Court ease of Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., which concerned the standard by which courts dismiss employment discrimination claims under Rule 12(b)(6), effectively may be dead. This Article concludes that the differences between the motion to dismiss and summary just call into question the propriety of Iqbal and Twombly.
Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)15-42
Number of pages28
JournalLewis & Clark Law Review
Volume14
Issue number1
StatePublished - Mar 1 2010

Keywords

  • UNITED States
  • SUMMARY judgments
  • DISMISSAL & nonsuit
  • CIVIL procedure
  • DISCRIMINATION in employment
  • PLAUSIBILITY (Logic)
  • BELL Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (Supreme Court case)

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