TY - JOUR
T1 - The Importance of Being Unearnest
T2 - Opportunists and the Making of Culture
AU - Hernandez, Ivan
AU - Cohen, Dov
AU - Gruschow, Karl
AU - Nowak, Andrzej
AU - Gelfand, Michele J.
AU - Borkowski, Wojciech
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2022. American Psychological Association
PY - 2022
Y1 - 2022
N2 - Opportunistic actors—who behave expediently, cheating when they can and offering minimal cooperation only when they have to—play an important role in producing some puzzling phenomena, including the flourishing of strong reciprocity, the peculiar correlation between positive and negative reciprocity within cultures of honor, and low levels of social capital within tight and collectivist cultures (that one might naively assume would produce high levels of social capital). Using agent-based models and an experiment, we show how Opportunistic actors enable the growth of Strong Reciprocators, whose strategy is the exact opposite of the Opportunists. Additionally, previous research has shown how the threat of punishment can sustain cooperation within a group. However, the present studies illustrate how stringent demands for cooperation and severe punishments for noncooperation can also backfire and reduce the amount of voluntary, uncoerced cooperation in a society. The studies illuminate the role Opportunists play in producing these backfire effects. In addition to highlighting other features shaping culture (e.g., risk and reward in the environment, “founder effects” requiring a critical mass of certain strategies at a culture’s initial stage), the studies help illustrate how Opportunists create aspects of culture that otherwise seem paradoxical, are dismissed as “error,” or produce unintended consequences.
AB - Opportunistic actors—who behave expediently, cheating when they can and offering minimal cooperation only when they have to—play an important role in producing some puzzling phenomena, including the flourishing of strong reciprocity, the peculiar correlation between positive and negative reciprocity within cultures of honor, and low levels of social capital within tight and collectivist cultures (that one might naively assume would produce high levels of social capital). Using agent-based models and an experiment, we show how Opportunistic actors enable the growth of Strong Reciprocators, whose strategy is the exact opposite of the Opportunists. Additionally, previous research has shown how the threat of punishment can sustain cooperation within a group. However, the present studies illustrate how stringent demands for cooperation and severe punishments for noncooperation can also backfire and reduce the amount of voluntary, uncoerced cooperation in a society. The studies illuminate the role Opportunists play in producing these backfire effects. In addition to highlighting other features shaping culture (e.g., risk and reward in the environment, “founder effects” requiring a critical mass of certain strategies at a culture’s initial stage), the studies help illustrate how Opportunists create aspects of culture that otherwise seem paradoxical, are dismissed as “error,” or produce unintended consequences.
KW - Culture
KW - Honor
KW - Individualism–collectivism
KW - Social capital
KW - Tightness
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85130597573&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85130597573&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1037/pspa0000301
DO - 10.1037/pspa0000301
M3 - Article
C2 - 35324241
AN - SCOPUS:85130597573
SN - 0022-3514
VL - 123
SP - 249
EP - 271
JO - Journal of personality and social psychology
JF - Journal of personality and social psychology
IS - 2
ER -