TY - JOUR
T1 - The Hazards of Expert Control
T2 - Chief Risk Officers and Risky Derivatives
AU - Pernell, Kim
AU - Jung, Jiwook
AU - Dobbin, Frank
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2017, © American Sociological Association 2017.
PY - 2017/6/1
Y1 - 2017/6/1
N2 - At the turn of the century, regulators introduced policies to control bank risk-taking. Many banks appointed chief risk officers (CROs), yet bank holdings of new, complex, and untested financial derivatives subsequently soared. Why did banks expand use of new derivatives? We suggest that CROs encouraged the rise of new derivatives in two ways. First, we build on institutional arguments about the expert construction of compliance, suggesting that risk experts arrived with an agenda of maximizing risk-adjusted returns, which led them to favor the derivatives. Second, we build on moral licensing arguments to suggest that bank appointment of CROs induced “organizational licensing,” leading trading-desk managers to reduce policing of their own risky behavior. We further argue that CEOs and fund managers bolstered or restrained derivatives use depending on their financial interests. We predict that CEOs favored new derivatives when their compensation rewarded risk-taking, but that both CEOs and fund managers opposed new derivatives when they held large illiquid stakes in banks. We test these predictions using data on derivatives holdings of 157 large banks between 1995 and 2010.
AB - At the turn of the century, regulators introduced policies to control bank risk-taking. Many banks appointed chief risk officers (CROs), yet bank holdings of new, complex, and untested financial derivatives subsequently soared. Why did banks expand use of new derivatives? We suggest that CROs encouraged the rise of new derivatives in two ways. First, we build on institutional arguments about the expert construction of compliance, suggesting that risk experts arrived with an agenda of maximizing risk-adjusted returns, which led them to favor the derivatives. Second, we build on moral licensing arguments to suggest that bank appointment of CROs induced “organizational licensing,” leading trading-desk managers to reduce policing of their own risky behavior. We further argue that CEOs and fund managers bolstered or restrained derivatives use depending on their financial interests. We predict that CEOs favored new derivatives when their compensation rewarded risk-taking, but that both CEOs and fund managers opposed new derivatives when they held large illiquid stakes in banks. We test these predictions using data on derivatives holdings of 157 large banks between 1995 and 2010.
KW - corporate governance
KW - economic sociology
KW - institutional theory
KW - organizations
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85020095935&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85020095935&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1177/0003122417701115
DO - 10.1177/0003122417701115
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85020095935
SN - 0003-1224
VL - 82
SP - 511
EP - 541
JO - American sociological review
JF - American sociological review
IS - 3
ER -