The good, the bad, and the ugly: Coalition proof equilibrium in infinite games

Charles M. Kahn, Dilip Mookherjee

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This paper provides techniques for using stable sets to characterize equilibria in infinite games. We demonstrate the techniques by extending the definition of Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium. Our new definition reduces to the recursive definition of Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston in games with a finite number of players and a finite strategy space. Unlike the old characterization, our new one maintains an equivalence between a recursive definition and a nonrecursive characterization when strategy spaces are infinite. Examples are used to demonstrate the advantages and relative simplicity of the new definition, even for games with infinite numbers of agents. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: 026.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)101-121
Number of pages21
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume4
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1992
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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