The folly of boxology

Diane M. Beck, John Clevenger

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Although the authors do a valuable service by elucidating the pitfalls of inferring top-down effects, they overreach by claiming that vision is cognitively impenetrable. Their argument, and the entire question of cognitive penetrability, seems rooted in a discrete, stage-like model of the mind that is unsupported by neural data.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)e231
JournalThe Behavioral and brain sciences
Volume39
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2016

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Neuropsychology and Physiological Psychology
  • Physiology
  • Behavioral Neuroscience

Cite this

The folly of boxology. / Beck, Diane M.; Clevenger, John.

In: The Behavioral and brain sciences, Vol. 39, 01.01.2016, p. e231.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Beck, Diane M. ; Clevenger, John. / The folly of boxology. In: The Behavioral and brain sciences. 2016 ; Vol. 39. pp. e231.
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