The folly of boxology

Diane M. Beck, John Clevenger

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Although the authors do a valuable service by elucidating the pitfalls of inferring top-down effects, they overreach by claiming that vision is cognitively impenetrable. Their argument, and the entire question of cognitive penetrability, seems rooted in a discrete, stage-like model of the mind that is unsupported by neural data.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)e231
JournalThe Behavioral and brain sciences
StatePublished - Jan 1 2016

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Neuropsychology and Physiological Psychology
  • Physiology
  • Behavioral Neuroscience


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