The Culpability of Negligence

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

Negligence is a problematic basis for being morally blamed and punished for having caused some harm, because in such cases there is no choice to cause, allow, or risk causing or allowing, such harm to occur. The leading two theories as to why inadvertent risk creation can be blameworthy despite the lack of culpable choice are that in such cases there is blame for: (1) an unexercised capacity to have adverted to the risk; or (2) a defect in character explaining why one did not advert to the risk. Neither of these is found to be an adequate basis for blaming inadvertent harm-causing. Three additional theories are briefly mentioned, according to which blame is assigned for: (3) culpably acquiring or failing to rid oneself of defects of character at some earlier time (the 'tracing strategies'); (4) flawed use of those practical reasoning capacities that make one the person one is; or (5) chosen violation of per se rules about known-to-be-available precautions. Although each of these five theories can justify blame in some cases of negligence, none can justify blame in all cases intuitively thought to be cases of negligence, nor can any of these five theories show why inadvertent creation of an unreasonable risk, pure and simple, can be blameworthy.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationCrime, Punishment, and Responsibility
Subtitle of host publicationThe Jurisprudence of Antony Duff
PublisherOxford University Press
ISBN (Electronic)9780191729034
ISBN (Print)9780199592814
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 22 2011

Fingerprint

cause
human being
lack
time

Keywords

  • Advertence
  • Capacity
  • Character
  • Inadvertence
  • Negligence
  • Recklessness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences(all)

Cite this

Moore, M., & Hurd, H. M. (2011). The Culpability of Negligence. In Crime, Punishment, and Responsibility: The Jurisprudence of Antony Duff Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199592814.003.0018

The Culpability of Negligence. / Moore, Michael; Hurd, Heidi M.

Crime, Punishment, and Responsibility: The Jurisprudence of Antony Duff. Oxford University Press, 2011.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Moore, M & Hurd, HM 2011, The Culpability of Negligence. in Crime, Punishment, and Responsibility: The Jurisprudence of Antony Duff. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199592814.003.0018
Moore M, Hurd HM. The Culpability of Negligence. In Crime, Punishment, and Responsibility: The Jurisprudence of Antony Duff. Oxford University Press. 2011 https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199592814.003.0018
Moore, Michael ; Hurd, Heidi M. / The Culpability of Negligence. Crime, Punishment, and Responsibility: The Jurisprudence of Antony Duff. Oxford University Press, 2011.
@inbook{3987d074e9a84104a82960fbb21cf229,
title = "The Culpability of Negligence",
abstract = "Negligence is a problematic basis for being morally blamed and punished for having caused some harm, because in such cases there is no choice to cause, allow, or risk causing or allowing, such harm to occur. The leading two theories as to why inadvertent risk creation can be blameworthy despite the lack of culpable choice are that in such cases there is blame for: (1) an unexercised capacity to have adverted to the risk; or (2) a defect in character explaining why one did not advert to the risk. Neither of these is found to be an adequate basis for blaming inadvertent harm-causing. Three additional theories are briefly mentioned, according to which blame is assigned for: (3) culpably acquiring or failing to rid oneself of defects of character at some earlier time (the 'tracing strategies'); (4) flawed use of those practical reasoning capacities that make one the person one is; or (5) chosen violation of per se rules about known-to-be-available precautions. Although each of these five theories can justify blame in some cases of negligence, none can justify blame in all cases intuitively thought to be cases of negligence, nor can any of these five theories show why inadvertent creation of an unreasonable risk, pure and simple, can be blameworthy.",
keywords = "Advertence, Capacity, Character, Inadvertence, Negligence, Recklessness",
author = "Michael Moore and Hurd, {Heidi M}",
year = "2011",
month = "9",
day = "22",
doi = "10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199592814.003.0018",
language = "English (US)",
isbn = "9780199592814",
booktitle = "Crime, Punishment, and Responsibility",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
address = "United States",

}

TY - CHAP

T1 - The Culpability of Negligence

AU - Moore, Michael

AU - Hurd, Heidi M

PY - 2011/9/22

Y1 - 2011/9/22

N2 - Negligence is a problematic basis for being morally blamed and punished for having caused some harm, because in such cases there is no choice to cause, allow, or risk causing or allowing, such harm to occur. The leading two theories as to why inadvertent risk creation can be blameworthy despite the lack of culpable choice are that in such cases there is blame for: (1) an unexercised capacity to have adverted to the risk; or (2) a defect in character explaining why one did not advert to the risk. Neither of these is found to be an adequate basis for blaming inadvertent harm-causing. Three additional theories are briefly mentioned, according to which blame is assigned for: (3) culpably acquiring or failing to rid oneself of defects of character at some earlier time (the 'tracing strategies'); (4) flawed use of those practical reasoning capacities that make one the person one is; or (5) chosen violation of per se rules about known-to-be-available precautions. Although each of these five theories can justify blame in some cases of negligence, none can justify blame in all cases intuitively thought to be cases of negligence, nor can any of these five theories show why inadvertent creation of an unreasonable risk, pure and simple, can be blameworthy.

AB - Negligence is a problematic basis for being morally blamed and punished for having caused some harm, because in such cases there is no choice to cause, allow, or risk causing or allowing, such harm to occur. The leading two theories as to why inadvertent risk creation can be blameworthy despite the lack of culpable choice are that in such cases there is blame for: (1) an unexercised capacity to have adverted to the risk; or (2) a defect in character explaining why one did not advert to the risk. Neither of these is found to be an adequate basis for blaming inadvertent harm-causing. Three additional theories are briefly mentioned, according to which blame is assigned for: (3) culpably acquiring or failing to rid oneself of defects of character at some earlier time (the 'tracing strategies'); (4) flawed use of those practical reasoning capacities that make one the person one is; or (5) chosen violation of per se rules about known-to-be-available precautions. Although each of these five theories can justify blame in some cases of negligence, none can justify blame in all cases intuitively thought to be cases of negligence, nor can any of these five theories show why inadvertent creation of an unreasonable risk, pure and simple, can be blameworthy.

KW - Advertence

KW - Capacity

KW - Character

KW - Inadvertence

KW - Negligence

KW - Recklessness

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84919683466&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84919683466&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199592814.003.0018

DO - 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199592814.003.0018

M3 - Chapter

SN - 9780199592814

BT - Crime, Punishment, and Responsibility

PB - Oxford University Press

ER -