The Causes of Impasses in Labor Disputes

LINDA C. BABCOCK, CRAIG A. OLSON

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Using data on teacher contract negotiations under final‐offer arbitration, this paper investigates the causes of impasses in contract negotiations and finds some support for each of three perspectives: game‐theoretic, psychological, and political. The large number of “consent awards” suggests that negotiators frequently wish to avoid the political costs of a compromise settlement, preferring to blame arbitrators for the outcome. The positive correlation between the probability of an impasse and the variance in comparable negotiated settlements suggests that the parties base their judgments of fairness using evidence most consistent with their own position.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)348-360
Number of pages13
JournalIndustrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society
Volume31
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 1992

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Industrial relations
  • Strategy and Management
  • Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
  • Management of Technology and Innovation

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