The analytic-continental divide in philosophical practice: An empirical study

Moti Mizrahi, Mike Dickinson

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Philosophy is often divided into two traditions: analytic and continental philosophy. Characterizing the analytic-continental divide, however, is no easy task. Some philosophers explain the divide in terms of the place of argument in these traditions. This raises the following questions: Is analytic philosophy rife with arguments while continental philosophy is devoid of arguments? Or can different types of arguments be found in analytic and continental philosophy? This paper presents the results of an empirical study of a large corpus of philosophical texts mined from the JSTOR database (n = 53,260) designed to find patterns of argumentation by type. Overall, the results suggest that there are no significant differences between the types of arguments advanced in analytic and continental philosophy journal articles. The findings, therefore, provide no empirical support to the hypothesis that the divide between analytic and continental philosophy has to do with the place of argument in these traditions.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)668-680
Number of pages13
JournalMetaphilosophy
Volume52
Issue number5
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 2021

Keywords

  • abductive argument
  • analytic philosophy
  • continental philosophy
  • deductive argument
  • indicator words
  • inductive argument
  • metaphilosophy
  • philosophical practice

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

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