TY - GEN
T1 - Technologies that can enforce the nuclear safeguards regime
AU - Khasawneh, Mohammed
AU - Malkawi, Mohamad
AU - Uddin, Rizwan
PY - 2010
Y1 - 2010
N2 - Enforcing the nuclear safeguards regime is essential to warrant no peaceful nuclear materials, establishments and devices are ever diverted or transformed into forms that make them amenable for military uses. Classical enforcement techniques have relied on international inspectors' assessment of the facility in question, checked against what facility operators would provide as their own reporting Under existing safeguarding tactics errors can still occur due to systematic measurement discrepancies or random measurement errors. Certain tolerance levels leave room for reasonable errors to exist. However, the previous regulatory regime set forth by the IAEA does not account for materials which can be recovered from production machinery, waste tanks, or losses to the environment, even when containment, surveillance measures and remote monitoring are well fixed into place. In this paper, we briefly review the main highlights of the nuclear safeguards regime and propose technologies which can offer continuous online monitoring and reporting for nuclear facilities, materials, and devices which are fixed in place or others that are in transit on their ways to storage, processing and/or handling sites.
AB - Enforcing the nuclear safeguards regime is essential to warrant no peaceful nuclear materials, establishments and devices are ever diverted or transformed into forms that make them amenable for military uses. Classical enforcement techniques have relied on international inspectors' assessment of the facility in question, checked against what facility operators would provide as their own reporting Under existing safeguarding tactics errors can still occur due to systematic measurement discrepancies or random measurement errors. Certain tolerance levels leave room for reasonable errors to exist. However, the previous regulatory regime set forth by the IAEA does not account for materials which can be recovered from production machinery, waste tanks, or losses to the environment, even when containment, surveillance measures and remote monitoring are well fixed into place. In this paper, we briefly review the main highlights of the nuclear safeguards regime and propose technologies which can offer continuous online monitoring and reporting for nuclear facilities, materials, and devices which are fixed in place or others that are in transit on their ways to storage, processing and/or handling sites.
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U2 - 10.1109/INREC.2010.5462559
DO - 10.1109/INREC.2010.5462559
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:77953257740
SN - 9781424452149
T3 - 2010 1st International Nuclear and Renewable Energy Conference, INREC'10
BT - 2010 1st International Nuclear and Renewable Energy Conference, INREC'10
PB - IEEE Computer Society
T2 - 2010 1st International Nuclear and Renewable Energy 2010 1st International Nuclear and Renewable Energy Conference, INREC'10
Y2 - 21 March 2010 through 24 March 2010
ER -