Team-optimal closed-loop Stackelberg strategies in hierarchical control problems

Tamer Başar, Geert Jan Olsder

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


This paper is concerned with the derivation of closed-loop Stackelberg (CLS) solutions of a class of continuous-time two-player nonzero-sum differential games characterized by linear state dynamics and quadratic cost functionals. Explicit conditions are obtained for both the finite and infinite horizon problems under which the CLS solution is a representation of the optimal feedback solution of a related team problem which is defined as the joint minimization of the leader's cost function. First, a specific class of representations is considered which depend linearly on the current and initial values of the state, and then the results are extended to encompass a more general class of linear strategies that also incorporate the whole past trajectory. The conditions obtained all involve solutions of linear matrix equations and are amenable to computational analysis for explicit determination of CLS strategies.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)409-414
Number of pages6
Issue number4
StatePublished - Jul 1980
Externally publishedYes


  • Differential games
  • Stackelberg strategies
  • game theory
  • hierarchical systems
  • large-scale systems
  • linear systems
  • multicriteria optimization
  • optimal control
  • optimal systems
  • team theory

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering


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