Abstract
This paper incorporates two novelties into steady-state, macroscopic models of street-hail taxi service: (i) heterogeneous drivers; (ii) explicit treatment of a competitive rental market for medallions (the rights to cruise for passengers). When drivers vary only by reservation wage, issuing medallions raises every driver's take-home pay, and the social optimum requires subsidy. When drivers vary only by marginal cost, issuing medallions may hurt drivers with low-enough marginal costs. Also, when quality declines with marginal cost, the social optimum may require a binding medallion quota or tax.
Original language | English (US) |
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Article number | 103488 |
Journal | Journal of Urban Economics |
Volume | 131 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Sep 2022 |
Keywords
- Medallions
- Regulation
- Taxis
- Transportation
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
- Urban Studies