Systems-Theoretic Likelihood and Severity Analysis for Safety and Security Co-engineering

William G. Temple, Yue Wu, Binbin Chen, Zbigniew Kalbarczyk

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

A number of methodologies and techniques have been proposed to integrate safety and security in risk assessment, but there is an ideological divide between component-centric and systems-theoretic approaches. In this paper, we propose a new hybrid method for Systems-Theoretic Likelihood and Severity Analysis (STLSA), which combines desirable characteristics from both schools of thought. Specifically, STLSA focuses on functional control actions in the system, including humans-in-the-loop, but incorporates semi-quantitative risk assessment based on existing industry practice. We demonstrate this new approach using the case study of train braking control.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationReliability, Safety, and Security of Railway Systems
Subtitle of host publicationModelling, Analysis, Verification, and Certification - 2nd International Conference, RSSRail 2017, Proceedings
EditorsThierry Lecomte, Alexander Romanovsky, Alessandro Fantechi
PublisherSpringer
Pages51-67
Number of pages17
ISBN (Print)9783319684987
DOIs
StatePublished - 2017
Event2nd International Conference on Reliability, Safety, and Security of Railway Systems, RSSRail 2017 - Pistoia, Italy
Duration: Nov 14 2017Nov 16 2017

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume10598 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Other

Other2nd International Conference on Reliability, Safety, and Security of Railway Systems, RSSRail 2017
Country/TerritoryItaly
CityPistoia
Period11/14/1711/16/17

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • General Computer Science

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