Abstract
Selfish mining, originally discovered by Eyal et al. [9], is a well-known attack where a selfish miner, under certain conditions, can gain a disproportionate share of reward by deviating from the honest behavior. In this paper, we expand the mining strategy space to include novel "stubborn" strategies that, for a large range of parameters, earn the miner more revenue. Consequently, we show that the selfish mining attack is not (in general) optimal. Further, we show how a miner can further amplify its gain by non-trivially composing mining attacks with network-level eclipse attacks. We show, surprisingly, that given the attacker's best strategy, in some cases victims of an eclipse attack can actually benefit from being eclipsed!
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages | 305-320 |
State | Published - Mar 2016 |
Event | 2016 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) - Saarbrucken, Germany Duration: Mar 21 2016 → Mar 24 2016 |
Conference
Conference | 2016 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) |
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Country/Territory | Germany |
City | Saarbrucken |
Period | 3/21/16 → 3/24/16 |
Keywords
- lead
- online banking
- peer-to-peer computing
- protocols
- cryptography
- computational modeling