Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule

Matthias Messner, Mattias K. Polborn

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We analyze the effects of voter coordination on the equilibrium of voting games. Specifically, we analyze the concepts of strong equilibrium and coalition-proof equilibrium for plurality rule and runoff rule elections. We characterize these equilibria in the three candidate case, and provide results for important special cases in the general multicandidate case.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)287-314
Number of pages28
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume35
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 2007

Keywords

  • Coalition-proofness
  • Communication
  • Plurality rule
  • Runoff rule
  • Strategic voting

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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