Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule

Matthias Messner; Mattias K. Polborn

doi:10.1007/s00182-006-0048-z

Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule

Matthias Messner, Mattias K. Polborn

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We analyze the effects of voter coordination on the equilibrium of voting games. Specifically, we analyze the concepts of strong equilibrium and coalition-proof equilibrium for plurality rule and runoff rule elections. We characterize these equilibria in the three candidate case, and provide results for important special cases in the general multicandidate case.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	287-314
Number of pages	28
Journal	International Journal of Game Theory
Volume	35
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0048-z
State	Published - Jan 2007

Keywords

Coalition-proofness
Communication
Plurality rule
Runoff rule
Strategic voting

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Statistics and Probability
Mathematics (miscellaneous)
Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
Economics and Econometrics
Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

Online availability

10.1007/s00182-006-0048-z

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abstract = "We analyze the effects of voter coordination on the equilibrium of voting games. Specifically, we analyze the concepts of strong equilibrium and coalition-proof equilibrium for plurality rule and runoff rule elections. We characterize these equilibria in the three candidate case, and provide results for important special cases in the general multicandidate case.",

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KW - Runoff rule

KW - Strategic voting

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Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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