Streisand Games on Complex Social Networks

Sujay Bhatt, Tamer Basar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution


This paper deals with the study of adversarial social contagion processes as a two-player game on finite complex networks. In our formulation, a censor affects the information diffusion dynamics on finite complex social networks, modeled as a controlled Markov chain, to minimize the number of infected (information aware) individuals. A stopper chooses when to terminate the information relayed to the network. This makes it a two-player dynamic game between the censor and the stopper, and is named as the Streisand game.We show that the game has a well-defined upper value, achieved by pure minimax strategies under the feedback information structure, and establish that it is an increasing function of the state. We provide a game-value iteration algorithm to compute the upper value and the minimax strategies.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2020 59th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2020
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9781728174471
StatePublished - Dec 14 2020
Externally publishedYes
Event59th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2020 - Virtual, Jeju Island, Korea, Republic of
Duration: Dec 14 2020Dec 18 2020

Publication series

NameProceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
ISSN (Print)0743-1546
ISSN (Electronic)2576-2370


Conference59th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2020
Country/TerritoryKorea, Republic of
CityVirtual, Jeju Island

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Modeling and Simulation
  • Control and Optimization


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