Strategic thinking under social influence: Scalability, stability and robustness of allocations

Dario Bauso, Tamer Başar

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This paper studies the strategic behavior of a large number of game designers and studies the scalability, stability and robustness of their allocations in a large number of homogeneous coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU). For each TU game, the characteristic function is a continuous-time stochastic process. In each game, a game designer allocates revenues based on the extra reward that a coalition has received up to the current time and the extra reward that the same coalition has received in the other games. The approach is based on the theory of mean-field games with heterogeneous groups in a multi-population regime.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1-15
Number of pages15
JournalEuropean Journal of Control
Volume32
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 1 2016

Keywords

  • Coalitional game theory
  • Differential games
  • Mean-field games
  • Optimal control

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Engineering(all)

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