Strategic stability in repeated signaling games

In Koo Cho

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This paper extends selection rules now used in the signaling literature (such as the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987)) to a class of repeated signaling games, where each player can exchange the messages conditioned on his private information. STABAC (STAbility and BACkward induction) is defined as a procedure whereby forward induction arguments (Kohlberg and Mertens (1986)) are applied in combination with the backward induction process. We specify the conditions under which any strategically stable outcome of a repeated signaling game includes an equilibrium that induces a stable equilibrium outcome in every subform, whence STABAC does not eliminate any stable outcome of the repeated signaling game.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)107-121
Number of pages15
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume22
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 1993
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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