@article{2373928f7efe4d52a7072ee793a16f05,
title = "Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games",
abstract = "A class of signaling games is studied in which a unique Universally Divine equilibrium outcome exists. We identify a monotonicity property under which a variation of Universal Divinity is generically equivalent to strategic stability. Further assumptions guarantee the existence of a unique Universally Divine outcome.",
author = "Cho, {In Koo} and Joel Sobel",
note = "Funding Information: * We thank Jeff Banks, Mark Machina, Georg Noldeke, Garey Ramey, Lones Smith, I&go Zapater, and seminar participants for helpful comments. Detailed remarks of two referees and an associate editor greatly improved the substance and presentation of this paper. We are grateful to the University of Chicago, the National Science Foundation, and the Sloan Foundation for financial support. Copyright: Copyright 2018 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.",
year = "1990",
month = apr,
doi = "10.1016/0022-0531(90)90009-9",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "50",
pages = "381--413",
journal = "Journal of Economic Theory",
issn = "0022-0531",
publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",
number = "2",
}