Strategic Information Design in Quadratic Multidimensional Persuasion Games with Two Senders

Raj Kiriti Velicheti, Melih Bastopcu, Tamer Basar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution


In the classical communication setting, multiple senders having access to the same source of information and transmitting it over channel(s) to a receiver, in general, leads to a decrease in estimation error at the receiver. However, if the objectives of the information providers are different from that of the estimator, this might result in interesting strategic interactions. In this work, we consider a hierarchical signaling game between two senders (information designers) and a single receiver (decision maker) each having their own, possibly misaligned, objectives. The senders lead the game by committing to individual information disclosure policies simultaneously, within the framework of a Nash game among themselves. This is followed by the receiver's action decision. With Gaussian information structure and quadratic objectives (which depend on underlying state and receiver's action) for all the players, we show that in general the equilibrium is not unique. While we show that full revelation of the state is always an equilibrium, we propose an algorithm to achieve non trivial equilibria. Through simulations we show that misalignment between senders' objectives is beneficial for the receiver.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2023 American Control Conference, ACC 2023
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Number of pages7
ISBN (Electronic)9798350328066
StatePublished - 2023
Event2023 American Control Conference, ACC 2023 - San Diego, United States
Duration: May 31 2023Jun 2 2023

Publication series

NameProceedings of the American Control Conference
ISSN (Print)0743-1619


Conference2023 American Control Conference, ACC 2023
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CitySan Diego

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering


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