Strategic communication between prospect theoretic agents over a Gaussian test channel

Venkata Sriram Siddhardh Nadendla, Emrah Akyol, Cedric Langbort, Tamer Basar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

In this paper, we model a Stackelberg game in a simple Gaussian test channel where a human transmitter (leader) communicates a source message to a human receiver (follower). We model human decision making using prospect theory models proposed for continuous decision spaces. Assuming that the value function is the squared distortion at both the transmitter and the receiver, we analyze the effects of the weight functions at both the transmitter and the receiver on optimal communication strategies, namely encoding at the transmitter and decoding at the receiver, in the Stackelberg sense. We show that the optimal strategies for the behavioral agents in the Stackelberg sense are identical to those designed for unbiased agents. At the same time, we also show that the prospect-theoretic distortions at both the transmitter and the receiver are both larger than the expected distortion, thus making behavioral agents less contended than unbiased agents. Consequently, the presence of cognitive biases increases the need for transmission power in order to achieve a given distortion at both transmitter and receiver.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationMILCOM 2017 - 2017 IEEE Military Communications Conference
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages109-114
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9781538605950
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 7 2017
Event2017 IEEE Military Communications Conference, MILCOM 2017 - Baltimore, United States
Duration: Oct 23 2017Oct 25 2017

Publication series

NameProceedings - IEEE Military Communications Conference MILCOM
Volume2017-October

Other

Other2017 IEEE Military Communications Conference, MILCOM 2017
CountryUnited States
CityBaltimore
Period10/23/1710/25/17

Keywords

  • Prospect Theory
  • Strategic Communication

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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