Abstract
We formulate a general framework of a competitive electricity generation supply market (CEM), embodying the salient attributes of the Poolco concept. This framework serves two principal purposes: to solve the selection by the CEM operator of the winners in a sealed bid auction for the right to serve load in each period of the auction horizon; and, to determine the profit - maximizing strategic bids of a generation supplier. The formulation represents the physical and operating considerations of the electric generation system, the multi-period nature of the auction as well as the market economics. The resulting large-scale nonlinear programming model has a structure that is effectively exploited for solution by Lagrangian relaxation. Under conditions of a perfectly competitive market, the strategic bids of a player can be derived analytically. Numerical results illustrate the effectiveness of the strategic bids. Directions for future research are discussed.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages | 309-315 |
Number of pages | 7 |
State | Published - 1999 |
Event | Proceedings of the 1999 Winter Meeting of IEEE Power Engineering Society. Part 1 (of 2) - New York, NY, USA Duration: Jan 31 1999 → Feb 4 1999 |
Other
Other | Proceedings of the 1999 Winter Meeting of IEEE Power Engineering Society. Part 1 (of 2) |
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City | New York, NY, USA |
Period | 1/31/99 → 2/4/99 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- General Engineering