Strategic bidding in electricity generation supply markets

George Gross, David J. Finlay, George Deltas

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperpeer-review

Abstract

We formulate a general framework of a competitive electricity generation supply market (CEM), embodying the salient attributes of the Poolco concept. This framework serves two principal purposes: to solve the selection by the CEM operator of the winners in a sealed bid auction for the right to serve load in each period of the auction horizon; and, to determine the profit - maximizing strategic bids of a generation supplier. The formulation represents the physical and operating considerations of the electric generation system, the multi-period nature of the auction as well as the market economics. The resulting large-scale nonlinear programming model has a structure that is effectively exploited for solution by Lagrangian relaxation. Under conditions of a perfectly competitive market, the strategic bids of a player can be derived analytically. Numerical results illustrate the effectiveness of the strategic bids. Directions for future research are discussed.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages309-315
Number of pages7
StatePublished - 1999
EventProceedings of the 1999 Winter Meeting of IEEE Power Engineering Society. Part 1 (of 2) - New York, NY, USA
Duration: Jan 31 1999Feb 4 1999

Other

OtherProceedings of the 1999 Winter Meeting of IEEE Power Engineering Society. Part 1 (of 2)
CityNew York, NY, USA
Period1/31/992/4/99

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Engineering

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