Stochastic games for security in networks with interdependent nodes

Kien C. Nguyen, Tansu Alpcan, M Tamer Basar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

This paper studies a stochastic game theoretic approach to security and intrusion detection in communication and computer networks. Specifically, an Attacker and a Defender take part in a two-player game over a network of nodes whose security assets and vulnerabilities are correlated. Such a network can be modeled using weighted directed graphs with the edges representing the influence among the nodes. The game can be formulated as a non-cooperative zero-sum or nonzerosum stochastic game. However, due to correlation among the nodes, if some nodes are compromised, the effective security assets and vulnerabilities of the remaining ones will not stay the same in general, which leads to complex system dynamics. We examine existence, uniqueness, and structure of the solution and also provide numerical examples to illustrate our model.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09
Pages697-703
Number of pages7
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 20 2009
Externally publishedYes
Event2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09 - Istanbul, Turkey
Duration: May 13 2009May 15 2009

Publication series

NameProceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09

Other

Other2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09
CountryTurkey
CityIstanbul
Period5/13/095/15/09

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition

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  • Cite this

    Nguyen, K. C., Alpcan, T., & Basar, M. T. (2009). Stochastic games for security in networks with interdependent nodes. In Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09 (pp. 697-703). [5137463] (Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09). https://doi.org/10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137463