### Abstract

This paper studies a stochastic game theoretic approach to security and intrusion detection in communication and computer networks. Specifically, an Attacker and a Defender take part in a two-player game over a network of nodes whose security assets and vulnerabilities are correlated. Such a network can be modeled using weighted directed graphs with the edges representing the influence among the nodes. The game can be formulated as a non-cooperative zero-sum or nonzerosum stochastic game. However, due to correlation among the nodes, if some nodes are compromised, the effective security assets and vulnerabilities of the remaining ones will not stay the same in general, which leads to complex system dynamics. We examine existence, uniqueness, and structure of the solution and also provide numerical examples to illustrate our model.

Original language | English (US) |
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Title of host publication | Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09 |

Pages | 697-703 |

Number of pages | 7 |

DOIs | |

State | Published - Oct 20 2009 |

Externally published | Yes |

Event | 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09 - Istanbul, Turkey Duration: May 13 2009 → May 15 2009 |

### Publication series

Name | Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09 |
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### Other

Other | 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09 |
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Country | Turkey |

City | Istanbul |

Period | 5/13/09 → 5/15/09 |

### ASJC Scopus subject areas

- Computer Networks and Communications
- Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition

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## Cite this

*Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09*(pp. 697-703). [5137463] (Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09). https://doi.org/10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137463