TY - JOUR
T1 - Splitting the check
T2 - explaining patterns of counterpart commitments in World Bank projects
AU - Winters, Matthew S.
AU - Streitfeld, Jaclyn D.
N1 - Funding Information:
18. The total project cost includes the World Bank’s commitment, funding from other multilateral and bilateral donors, and counterpart commitments.
Funding Information:
Previous versions of this article were presented at the 2011 Midwest Political Science Association and American Political Science Association Annual Meetings, the 2012 Political-Economy of International Organizations Conference, the 2013 Zuckerman Conference of the Mellon Interdisciplinary Fellows Program at Columbia University, the 2013 New Directions in Foreign Aid Conference at Princeton University, the University of Wisconsin, the National University of Singapore, the University of Connecticut, the University of S?o Paulo and the College of William & Mary. Thanks to Mark Buntaine, Xinyuan Dai, Simone Dietrich, Andreas Fuchs, Felix Gerlsbeck, Desha Girod, Chris Humphrey, Christopher Kilby, Rick Loeza, Espen Moe, Bob Pahre and Haley Swedlund for comments and to William Bernhard for useful conversations. Thanks to Valerie Ferrin for useful research assistance.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2018, © 2018 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
PY - 2018/11/2
Y1 - 2018/11/2
N2 - The literature on the autonomy of international organizations describes how bureaucratic agents often operate with slack that allows them to pursue their preferences in the shadow of institutional mandates. We study the division of costs in World Bank projects between the Bank and its borrowers. If this is a realm in which World Bank bureaucrats exert agency, we expect to see counterpart financing vary with poverty and governance, in line with theories about aid selectivity. If, on the other hand, this is a realm in which the Bank’s state principals exert influence, we expect strategic interest measures to predict the division of financing. If counterpart commitments represent the outcome of Bank-borrower bargaining, we expect borrowers with outside options to contribute less. A 2004 rule revision at the Bank provides an opportunity to study how financing patterns changed when bureaucratic agents obtained more discretion. We show that increased flexibility within the Bank led to a deployment of resources that favored poorer countries, in line with the organizational mission of the Bank. We find less evidence of governance selectivity, and we find mixed results with regard to how a country’s strategic importance or bargaining power influenced levels of counterpart funding.
AB - The literature on the autonomy of international organizations describes how bureaucratic agents often operate with slack that allows them to pursue their preferences in the shadow of institutional mandates. We study the division of costs in World Bank projects between the Bank and its borrowers. If this is a realm in which World Bank bureaucrats exert agency, we expect to see counterpart financing vary with poverty and governance, in line with theories about aid selectivity. If, on the other hand, this is a realm in which the Bank’s state principals exert influence, we expect strategic interest measures to predict the division of financing. If counterpart commitments represent the outcome of Bank-borrower bargaining, we expect borrowers with outside options to contribute less. A 2004 rule revision at the Bank provides an opportunity to study how financing patterns changed when bureaucratic agents obtained more discretion. We show that increased flexibility within the Bank led to a deployment of resources that favored poorer countries, in line with the organizational mission of the Bank. We find less evidence of governance selectivity, and we find mixed results with regard to how a country’s strategic importance or bargaining power influenced levels of counterpart funding.
KW - World Bank
KW - bureaucracy
KW - development
KW - development finance
KW - foreign aid
KW - international organizations
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U2 - 10.1080/09692290.2018.1490328
DO - 10.1080/09692290.2018.1490328
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85055481668
SN - 0969-2290
VL - 25
SP - 884
EP - 908
JO - Review of International Political Economy
JF - Review of International Political Economy
IS - 6
ER -