@article{7ae20312263741fd8fc88e782ce77763,
title = "Soft powering the China Water Machine: the Bui Dam and China–Ghana relations",
abstract = "Although Ghana{\textquoteright}s Bui Dam had been planned since 1915, it was only completed in 2013, with China{\textquoteright}s financial and technical support. The Ghanaian government touted this breakthrough as crucial in addressing its enduring energy challenges and achieving its developmental goals. Critics, however, protested the project on the grounds of imminent displacement of local populations and the irreversible alteration of the environment. Since coming on stream, the dam has transformed China–Ghana relations from sporadic to sustained engagements. Using soft power as a framework, this paper examines the dam{\textquoteright}s significance for relations between the two countries. The article asserts that China{\textquoteright}s assistance with the dam was intended to cultivate soft power to bolster the market expansion of Chinese companies. It concludes that soft power seems productive at the macro level but is limited at lower levels.",
keywords = "Bui Dam, China Water Machine, China–Africa, Ghana, soft power",
author = "{Adovor Tsikudo}, Kwame",
note = "Funding Information: Finance is yet another resource China uses in getting what it wants. Bui{\textquoteright}s financial agreement was negotiated between China and Ghanaian state officials. The Ghanaian team was led by the MOFEP, MOE, EC, BPA, the Water Resources Commission (WRC) and the EPA. The Chinese team, on the other hand, comprised line ministries, czars and corporations, including the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), EXIM Bank and Sinohydro. The negotiations were described as “tough,” but yielded a hybrid financial package, comprising a concessional loan from the Chinese government, a buyer{\textquoteright}s credit from EXIM Bank and counterpart funding from the Ghanaian government (). The arrangement brought the dam{\textquoteright}s initial cost to 622 million USD (Souvannaseng ). However, construction experienced a cost overrun in 2009 due to unforeseen economic upheavals resulting from the 2008/2009 global economic recession. China augmented this shortfall with an additional 168 million USD to finish the project. Funding Information: I am grateful to Joe Getzoff, Janeke Thumbran, Foster Ntow, Abigail Asangba, and Sravanthi Kollu for their comments on the original version of this manuscript. All other errors are mine. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2021 Canadian Association of African Studies.",
year = "2022",
doi = "10.1080/00083968.2021.1929360",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "56",
pages = "319--339",
journal = "Canadian Journal of African Studies",
issn = "0008-3968",
publisher = "Canadian Association of African Studies",
number = "2",
}