Social welfare of selfish agents: Motivating efficiency for divisible resources

Rajiv T. Maheswaran, Tamer Başar

Research output: Contribution to journalConference articlepeer-review

Abstract

In today's landscape of distributed and autonomous computing, there is a challenge to construct mechanisms which can induce selfish agents to act in a way that satisfies a global goal. In the domain for the allocation of computational and network resources, proportionally fair schemes are commonly advocated. In this paper, we investigate the efficiency of the resulting equilibria in such systems. We then develop a method of generating an entire class of divisible auctions with minimal signaling and computation costs which maximize social welfare even though agents act solely to optimize their own utility.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article numberWeA05.3
Pages (from-to)1550-1555
Number of pages6
JournalProceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
Volume2
DOIs
StatePublished - 2004
Event2004 43rd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC) - Nassau, Bahamas
Duration: Dec 14 2004Dec 17 2004

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Modeling and Simulation
  • Control and Optimization

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