Social networks

Sadegh Bolouki, Angelia Nedić, M Tamer Basar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

In this chapter, some applications of game theory in social network analysis are presented. We first focus on the opinion dynamics of a social network. Viewing the individuals as players of a game with appropriately defined action (opinion) sets and utility functions, we investigate the best response dynamics and its variants for the game, which would in effect represent the evolution of the individuals' opinions within a social network. The action sets are defined according to the nature of the opinions, which may be continuous, as for the political beliefs of the individuals, or discrete, as for the type of technology adopted by the individuals to use in their daily lives. The utility functions, on the other hand, are to best capture the social behavior of the individuals such as conformity and stubbornness. For every formulation of the game, we characterize the formation of the opinions as time grows. In particular, we determine whether an agreement among all of the individuals is reached, a clustering of opinions occurs, or none of the said cases happens. We further investigate the Nash equilibria of the game and make clear if the game dynamics converges to one of the Nash equilibria. The rate of convergence to the equilibrium, if it is the case, is also obtained. We then turn our attention to decision-making processes (elections) in social networks, where a collective decision (social choice) must be made by multiple individuals (voters) with different preferences over the alternatives (candidates). We argue that the nonexistence of a perfectly fair social choice function that takes all voter preferences into account leads to the emergence of various strategic games in decision-making processes, most notably strategic voting, strategic candidacy, and coalition formation. While the strategic voting would be played among the voters, the other two games would be played among the candidates. We explicitly discuss the games of strategic candidacy and coalition formation.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationHandbook of Dynamic Game Theory
PublisherSpringer International Publishing
Pages907-949
Number of pages43
ISBN (Electronic)9783319443744
ISBN (Print)9783319443737
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 12 2018

Fingerprint

Social Networks
Game
Coalition Formation
Social Choice
Voting
Utility Function
Nash Equilibrium
Decision Making
Opinion Dynamics
Choice Function
Social Network Analysis
Dynamic Games
Social Behavior
Vote
Elections
Game Theory
Social networks
Dynamic Response
Nonexistence
Rate of Convergence

Keywords

  • Coalition formation
  • Coordination games
  • Game theory
  • Opinion dynamics
  • Potential games
  • Social choice
  • Social networks
  • Strategic candidacy
  • Strategic voting

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Mathematics(all)
  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)

Cite this

Bolouki, S., Nedić, A., & Basar, M. T. (2018). Social networks. In Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory (pp. 907-949). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44374-4_32

Social networks. / Bolouki, Sadegh; Nedić, Angelia; Basar, M Tamer.

Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory. Springer International Publishing, 2018. p. 907-949.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Bolouki, S, Nedić, A & Basar, MT 2018, Social networks. in Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory. Springer International Publishing, pp. 907-949. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44374-4_32
Bolouki S, Nedić A, Basar MT. Social networks. In Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory. Springer International Publishing. 2018. p. 907-949 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44374-4_32
Bolouki, Sadegh ; Nedić, Angelia ; Basar, M Tamer. / Social networks. Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory. Springer International Publishing, 2018. pp. 907-949
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