TY - JOUR
T1 - Simulation of Premovement Active Surveillance Protocols for Moving Finishing Pigs to a Harvest Facility from a Control Area during an Outbreak of African Swine Fever in the United States
AU - Bonney, Peter J.
AU - Malladi, Sasidhar
AU - Ssematimba, Amos
AU - O'Hara, Kathleen C.
AU - Remmenga, Marta D.
AU - Farr, Michelle
AU - Leonard, Mickey
AU - Alexander, Catherine Y.
AU - Blair, Benjamin
AU - Martin, Sylvia Wanzala
AU - Culhane, Marie R.
AU - Corzo, Cesar A.
N1 - The authors would like to acknowledge the informal contributions and support of the entire Secure Food Systems team at the University of Minnesota, which also includes Carol Cardona, Timothy Goldsmith, David Halvorson, Rosemary Marusak, Emily Walz, Margret Tavai-Tuisalo'o, Miranda Medrano, and Kaitlyn St. Charles. The authors thank Dr. Helena C. de Carvalho Ferreira for providing experimental data on moderately virulent African swine fever virus strains from her 2013 article. The authors are funded by a USDANational Institute of Food and Agriculture (NIFA) grant 2020-68014-30974 (The Secure Food System: a cross-commodity risk-based approach for preserving agricultural business continuity during disease emergencies) and from a cooperative agreement between the Center for Epidemiology and Animal Health (CEAH) of the USDA, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) Veterinary Services (VS), and the University of Minnesota (UMN) as USDA Award # AP22VSSP0000C051 (Quantitative Analysis and Support for Agricultural Animal Disease Emergency Preparedness and Response in the U.S.). Carlos A. Corzo is also funded by the Leman Chair in Swine Health and Productivity at the University of Minnesota, College of Veterinary Medicine.
PY - 2024
Y1 - 2024
N2 - Movement restrictions are a critical component of response plans for an African swine fever (ASF) outbreak in the United States. These restrictions are likely to include requiring permits to move animals and products within, into, and out of 5-km control areas (CAs) established around confirmed positive farms. For quarantined finishing farms located within a CA, diagnostic testing is an expected criterion for receival of a permit to move pigs to a harvest facility or removal of quarantine. A stochastic disease transmission and active surveillance model were used to evaluate premovement active surveillance protocols varying by the number of samples and timing of sample collection before movement. Surveillance protocol scenarios were evaluated for several different sampling prioritization schemes; virus strains of medium or high virulence; barn sizes of 1,200, 2,400, and 4,800 pigs; and farms with average to high mortality and morbidity during routine production. Surveillance protocols that included prioritization schemes targeting dead pigs and pigs with clinical signs resulted in the highest probabilities of detection and the lowest numbers of infectious pigs at the time of movement in barns that went undetected. There was some evidence that targeting sick pigs prior to dead pigs may be more effective for moderately virulent strains. However, in most scenarios, including all highly virulent strain scenarios and moderately virulent strain scenarios in barn sizes of 1,200 with average farm performance, prioritization of dead versus sick pigs first did not have a large impact on the predicted outcomes. Increasing sample sizes improved outcomes, though only marginal gains were achieved once the available dead and sick were sampled. Predicted outcomes may be further improved by sampling the available dead and sick pigs in a barn across multiple days, though the associated increase in the probability of detection was minor.
AB - Movement restrictions are a critical component of response plans for an African swine fever (ASF) outbreak in the United States. These restrictions are likely to include requiring permits to move animals and products within, into, and out of 5-km control areas (CAs) established around confirmed positive farms. For quarantined finishing farms located within a CA, diagnostic testing is an expected criterion for receival of a permit to move pigs to a harvest facility or removal of quarantine. A stochastic disease transmission and active surveillance model were used to evaluate premovement active surveillance protocols varying by the number of samples and timing of sample collection before movement. Surveillance protocol scenarios were evaluated for several different sampling prioritization schemes; virus strains of medium or high virulence; barn sizes of 1,200, 2,400, and 4,800 pigs; and farms with average to high mortality and morbidity during routine production. Surveillance protocols that included prioritization schemes targeting dead pigs and pigs with clinical signs resulted in the highest probabilities of detection and the lowest numbers of infectious pigs at the time of movement in barns that went undetected. There was some evidence that targeting sick pigs prior to dead pigs may be more effective for moderately virulent strains. However, in most scenarios, including all highly virulent strain scenarios and moderately virulent strain scenarios in barn sizes of 1,200 with average farm performance, prioritization of dead versus sick pigs first did not have a large impact on the predicted outcomes. Increasing sample sizes improved outcomes, though only marginal gains were achieved once the available dead and sick were sampled. Predicted outcomes may be further improved by sampling the available dead and sick pigs in a barn across multiple days, though the associated increase in the probability of detection was minor.
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U2 - 10.1155/2024/6657600
DO - 10.1155/2024/6657600
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85203858707
SN - 1865-1674
VL - 2024
JO - Transboundary and Emerging Diseases
JF - Transboundary and Emerging Diseases
M1 - 6657600
ER -