Sequential public signaling in routing games with feedback information

Lichun Li, Olivier Massicot, Cedric Langbort

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

It is known that in traffic systems, less information can lead to better social welfare. This paper studies how to sequentially reveal traffic information to drivers to minimize social cost. We model this game as a multi-stage Stackelberg game between a designer, who sends public messages about traffic situation to drivers, and drivers, who can help improve the designer's observations. This paper studies the belief systems and the optimal strategies of both players, shows that drivers have a stationary optimal strategy, and provides a recursive formula to compute the designer's optimal strategy. Our simulation results indicate that feedback information from drivers help reduce total social cost and refine their own belief. In some cases, the designer broadcasts confusing information such that more drivers choose the congested path, which leads to more accurate future observation of the designer. In this way, the designer gains better future social welfare by sacrificing a little current social welfare.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2018 IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2018
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages2735-2740
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9781538613955
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 18 2019
Event57th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2018 - Miami, United States
Duration: Dec 17 2018Dec 19 2018

Publication series

NameProceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
Volume2018-December
ISSN (Print)0743-1546

Conference

Conference57th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2018
CountryUnited States
CityMiami
Period12/17/1812/19/18

Fingerprint

Driver
Routing
Game
Feedback
Welfare
Optimal Strategy
Telecommunication traffic
Costs
Information systems
Traffic
Stackelberg Game
Recursive Formula
Broadcast
Choose
Minimise
Path
Simulation
Observation
Beliefs

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Modeling and Simulation
  • Control and Optimization

Cite this

Li, L., Massicot, O., & Langbort, C. (2019). Sequential public signaling in routing games with feedback information. In 2018 IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2018 (pp. 2735-2740). [8619619] (Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control; Vol. 2018-December). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2018.8619619

Sequential public signaling in routing games with feedback information. / Li, Lichun; Massicot, Olivier; Langbort, Cedric.

2018 IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2018. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2019. p. 2735-2740 8619619 (Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control; Vol. 2018-December).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Li, L, Massicot, O & Langbort, C 2019, Sequential public signaling in routing games with feedback information. in 2018 IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2018., 8619619, Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, vol. 2018-December, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 2735-2740, 57th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2018, Miami, United States, 12/17/18. https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2018.8619619
Li L, Massicot O, Langbort C. Sequential public signaling in routing games with feedback information. In 2018 IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2018. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2019. p. 2735-2740. 8619619. (Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control). https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2018.8619619
Li, Lichun ; Massicot, Olivier ; Langbort, Cedric. / Sequential public signaling in routing games with feedback information. 2018 IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2018. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2019. pp. 2735-2740 (Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control).
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