Security games with decision and observation errors

Kien C. Nguyen, Tansu Alpcan, Tamer Başar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution


We study two-player security games which can be viewed as sequences of nonzero-sum matrix games played by an Attacker and a Defender. The evolution of the game is based on a stochastic fictitious play process. Players do not have access to each other's payoff matrix. Each has to observe the other's actions up to present and plays the action generated based on the best response to these observations. However, when the game is played over a communication network, there are several practical issues that need to be taken into account: First, the players may make random decision errors from time to time. Second, the players' observations of each other's previous actions may be incorrect. The players will try to compensate for these errors based on the information they have. We examine convergence property of the game in such scenarios, and establish convergence to the equilibrium point under some mild assumptions when both players are restricted to two actions.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 2010 American Control Conference, ACC 2010
PublisherIEEE Computer Society
Number of pages6
ISBN (Print)9781424474264
StatePublished - 2010

Publication series

NameProceedings of the 2010 American Control Conference, ACC 2010

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering


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